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ABSTRACT 
 
In the last two decades, an intense debate on the influence of financing constraints on the 
investment decisions of firms has emerged. One point of view (e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen, 1988) argues that investment spending of a firm is affected by its level of internal funds. 
Another point of view (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) argues that the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity cannot be used as a measure of financing constraints. Although, these two positions 
seem contradictory, this paper proposes a new test aiming at reconciling these two opposite views. 
This new test emphasizes the crucial role that the classification criteria used plays on the 
empirical results obtained. Therefore, two main empirical predictions were tested. Firstly, if firms 
are classified according to the degree of asymmetric information problems that they face in 
financial markets, a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow would be expected for firms that 
face these problems at a higher level. Secondly, if firms are classified according to their financial 
status, investment by firms in a better financial position would be expected to be more sensitive to 
cash flow variations. The empirical findings obtained in this paper, using a sample of Portuguese 
manufacturing firms, did not allow to confirm these empirical predictions. In fact, from the 
regression results obtained, it was possible to see that the cash flow variable has a major impact 
for firms facing higher asymmetric information problems in financial markets and for firms in 
poor financial status. Thus, one can be led to think that these results would favour the predictions 
of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) instead of the one’s proposed by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n the last two decades, an intense debate emerged on whether investment decisions of firms are affected 
by financing constraints. 
 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) argue that, at least for certain types of firms (e.g. small, young and 
low-dividend payout), investment spending is affected by the level of internal funds. Although some kind of firms 
can easily obtain external funds to smoothen their investment expenses when internal funds fluctuate, the time and 
the amount of capital outlays of other firms, with limited or no access to external funds, will likely be conditioned 
by fluctuations in internal funds. This situation of under-investment of firms is due to information problems in 
financial markets
1
. The findings of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) have been corroborated by a large body of 
empirical evidence
2
. 
                                                 
1 See the works of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on agency theory, and the works of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984) on asymmetric information problems. 
2 For example, United States [e.g. Whited (1992); Fazzari and Petersen (1993); Vogt (1994); Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995); 
Chirinko and Schaller (1995); Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995); Lamont (1997)], Canada [e.g. Schaller (1993)], Mexico 
[e.g. Gelos and Werner (2002)], Germany [e.g. Mizen and Vermeulen (2005)], United Kingdom [e.g. Bond and Meghir (1994); 
I 
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Kaplan and Zingales (1997), on the other hand, argue that the investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be 
used as a measure of financing constraints. In fact, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) found that investment by financially 
healthy firms was more sensitive to fluctuations in cash flows. A similar finding was attained by Cleary (1999) and 
Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick (1998). 
 
In this context, the present paper aims at contributing to the empirical literature on the investment-cash flow 
relationship by presenting a new test for measuring the impact of financial variables on the investment spending of 
firms.  This new test, based on data from a sample of Portuguese manufacturing firms, emphasizes the crucial role 
that the classification criteria used plays on the empirical results obtained. Two main empirical predictions were 
tested. Firstly, if firms are classified according to the degree of asymmetric information problems that they face in 
financial markets, a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow would be expected for firms that face these 
problems at a higher level. Secondly, if firms are classified according to their financial status, investment by firms in 
a better financial position would be expected to be more sensitive to cash flow variations. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the literature on 
the investment-cash flow relationship. Section 3 provides a brief description of the data set and the classification 
criteria used. Section 4 describes the specification adopted for the econometric investment equation. Section 5 
presents the estimation results obtained. Finally, section 6 presents the main conclusions of the tests undertaken. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Given the controversy generated by the opposite findings of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), a number of authors have proposed several explanations in an attempt to reconcile 
those findings. 
 
One line of research, followed by Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), explained these two apparently 
opposite results, by emphasising the impact that the negative cash flows have on regression results. These authors 
highlighted the impact that a bad financial situation of a firm has on investment. In fact, in these cases, investment 
expenses could not react to changes in cash flows and a severe lack of funds can lead to situations of financial 
distress, where a firm can only make the absolute essential investments. Therefore, it is impossible to have more cuts 
in investment in response to a decline in cash flows, hence the sensitivity investment-cash flow is very low (or 
inexistent). Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) argued that the more constrained firms have more restricted access to 
external financing, thereby reaching more rapidly this “minimal investment stage”. As a result, an unconstrained 
firm is likely to have a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity than a constrained one, when internal funds are 
particularly low. To identify firms in financial distress, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) suggested that negative 
cash flows could be a good proxy. If, in the group of firms classified as more financially constrained, a large fraction 
of firms with negative cash flows is included, then the existence of low investment-cash flow sensitivity can be 
explained. 
 
Another line of research followed by several authors consisted in investigating whether there is a U-shaped 
relationship between investment and internal funds. 
 
Cleary, Povel and Raith (2007) developed a static model that attempts to explain the relationship between 
the level of investment spending of a firm and its level of internal funds. Their model is based on following three 
main assumptions: a) external funds are more costly than internal funds; b) the cost of raising funds is endogenously 
determined; and c) a firm can choose between larger and smaller investments. The main finding of Cleary, Povel 
and Raith (2007: 1) is that “a firm‟s investment is a U-shaped function of its internal funds”. This result is due to the 
fact that there are two opposing effects that occur simultaneously: a cost effect and a revenue effect. The cost effect 
means that investment tends to decrease when internal funds decline, due to the increase in the cost of external 
                                                                                                                                                             
Goergen and Renneboog (2001)], France [e.g. Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (2003)], Italy [e.g. Vermeulen (2002)], Spain 
[e.g. Palenzuela and Iturriaga (1998)], Belgium [e.g. Deloof (1998)], Czech Republic [e.g. Bo, Lensink and Sterken (2003)], 
Japan [e.g. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991)], South Korea [e.g. Shin and Park (1999); Kim (1999)], Australia [e.g. Mills, 
Morling and Tease (1995)]. 
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funds. The revenue effect derives from the fact that when a firm makes an investment, this is likely to increase its 
revenues in the future, thus allowing to pay their debts. Therefore, if the former effect dominates, an increase in 
internal funds leads to an increase in investment spending. On the other hand, if the latter effect dominates, an 
increase in internal funds leads to a decrease in investment spending. 
 
Kasahara (2008) developed a dynamic model of investment where he demonstrated that the possibility of a 
severely constrained firm to invest more than a less constrained one. The model is based in two important 
assumptions: (a) the project value and the degree of financing constraints can vary over time; and (b) there is an 
irreversibility of investment decisions. In his analysis, Kasahara (2008) identifies two effects: the cost effect 
(meaning that external funds become more costly when there is a decline in internal funds, due to an increase in 
financial risk) and the “risk-preemptive” effect (meaning that firms can have an incentive to increase their 
investment expenses to avoid further financial risk in a future period, regardless of an increase in the cost of funds in 
the present). The conclusion that a more constrained firm invest more that an unconstrained one is reached when the 
“risk-preemptive effect” overweights the cost effect. 
 
Lyandres (2007) highlighted the importance of the “model set-up” in understanding the investment-
financing constraints relationship. In fact, Lyandres (2007) argues that, in the context of a static model (where it is 
assume that the investment decision is a “now or never” decision), it is plausible to reach the conclusion that there is 
a monotonic relation between investment decisions and the degree of financing constraints. However, when 
considering a dynamic model (where it is assumed that the investment decision is of the type “now or maybe later”), 
that relationship can be non-monotonic. In the dynamic setting proposed by Lyandres (2007), two opposite effects 
counterbalance each other: the “static effect” and the “dynamic effect”. An increase in the cost of external financing 
leads, through the “static effect”, to a decline in the attractiveness of the current investment. But it is also reflected in 
a decline in the attractiveness of the future investment, through the “dynamic effect”. Lyandres (2007) argues that 
the “static effect” dominates the “dynamic effect” for firms relatively more constrained that face higher costs of 
external funds. However, the “dynamic effect” dominates the “static effect” for firms relatively not so constrained. 
This results in a “U-shaped” relationship between the cost of external financing and the sensitivity of investment to 
internal funds. 
 
Boyle and Guthrie (2003) presented a dynamic model in which the optimal timing for an investment 
decision assumes a critical role. In the development of their model, these authors identified two opposite effects that 
offset each other: a cost effect and a “wait-risk” effect. The former means that more funds lead to a decrease in the 
cost of investment and to an increase in investment. The latter means that more funds decrease the risk of waiting to 
invest, therefore increasing the opportunity cost of current investment, which leads to a decrease in investment. 
Therefore, according to Boyle and Guthrie (2003), two situations can happen: (a) a situation of underinvestment 
(resulting from the cost effect); and (b) a situation of accelerated investment (resulting from the “risk of wait” 
effect). If this second effect prevails in certain types of firms (which is more likely in the case of high liquid firms), 
it would be expected a larger sensitivity of investment to cash flows for this kind of firms. 
 
However, Almeida and Campello (2006) proposed yet another type of explanation for the controversy in 
the results obtained for the investment-cash flow relationship. In fact, these authors developed a theoretical 
argument which allows them to identify whether financing imperfections affect the investment behaviour of firms. A 
key element in this approach is the degree of “asset tangibility” of the assets that a firm owns. That is, the larger the 
fraction of the firms‟ assets that can be given as collateral, the more borrowed funds a firm can use to finance their 
investment plans. Therefore, Almeida and Campello (2006) were able to demonstrate that, in the case of constrained 
firms, the investment-cash flow relationship is monotonic, since there is a low degree of “asset tangibility”. On the 
other hand, if there is a high degree of “asset tangibility” (which means that firms tend to be financially 
unconstrained), the link between investment and cash flow weakens, hence the assumption of monotonicity is not 
verified. 
 
Finally, Caggese (2007) suggested a new test for the financing constraints hypothesis. The proposed test is 
derived from a structural model of a risk-taking firm that produces output from two complementary inputs: variable 
and fixed capital. Caggese (2007) demonstrates that, in the presence of financing imperfections, the correlation 
between the financial status of a firm and the investment in variable capital is a good indicator of the presence of 
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financing constraints. Caggese (2007) argues that this new test has the important advantage of reducing the 
misspecification and omitted variables problems in the investment equation, since variable capital investment is less 
affected by adjustment costs than fixed investment. Therefore, it is easier to distinguishing between the financial 
factor effects from the productivity shock effects on investment decisions of firms. 
 
DATA 
 
Sample and Variables Used 
 
The data used in the empirical study was provided by the Bank of Portugal Central Balance-Sheet 
Department. This department gathers economic and financial information for a sample of non-financial corporations.  
As a common standard in the majority of studies concerning the investment-cash flow relationship, the data used 
relates to firms belonging to the manufacturing sector. The study covers a period between 1990 and 2000. 
  
In order to be included in the sample firms had to meet several criteria
3
. Firstly, only private firms, 
belonging to the manufacturing sector, with at least 25 employees, were considered. Secondly, only firms that 
presented values for all variables and for every year of the period considered were selected. Finally, firms with 
outlier values were eliminated. These resulted in a balanced panel data set comprising 714 firms. 
 
As far as the variables used in the empirical study are concerned, they were computed from the accounting 
information of firms and comprised the following: 
 
 Investment (I): corresponds to acquisitions of structures and equipments; 
 Stock of capital (K): represented by fixed assets; 
 Sales (S): are total turnover of the firm; 
 Cash flow (CF) given by the sum of profits and depreciation. 
 Debt (D) corresponds to the total interest-bearing liabilities of the firm. 
 
Criteria for Splitting Firms 
 
This subsection presents the criteria used to identify firms according to (1) the degree of asymmetric 
information problems in financial markets and (2) to its financial status. 
 
Proxies for asymmetric information 
 
To classify firms according to the degree of asymmetric information problems they face in financial 
markets, two criteria were used: size and age. 
 
The first criterion used to classify firms was size (large firms vs. small firms). The hypothesis under test 
was whether the impact of cash flows is higher for small firms than for larger ones. Actually, some authors (e.g. 
Gelos and Werner, 2002, Chow and Fung, 2000, Kim, 1999, Schiantarelli, 1996, and Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 
1995) argue that larger firms face fewer asymmetric information problems in financial markets, thus are less subject 
to financial restrictions. Several reasons may justify this argument. Firstly, larger firms have an easier access to 
capital markets, due to the possibility of using the firm‟s assets as collateral. Secondly, it is likely that transaction 
costs for new share or bond issues decrease according to size. Thirdly, larger companies can use more different 
sources of funding than small companies, which allow large companies to reduce the risk of financing.  Finally, it is 
likely that small firms suffer more from the idiosyncratic risk. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 It should be noticed that the identification of each firm was not known to the authors in order to meet statistical confidentiality. 
Firms were, only, identified by a number. 
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To identify the large and the small firms, the sales variable was used. A firm was included in the group of 
large firms if it had a sales value greater than € 4,570,0004. Otherwise, it was included in the group of small firms. 
Each group is constituted by 174 and 540 firms, respectively. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for both types of 
firms – large and small. 
 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics for Firms Classified According to Size (S.D. indicates Standard Deviation) 
Variables 
Large Firms Small Firms 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
K  (€) 9,593,937 10,156,390 1,287,812 1,605,958 
I  (€) 1,941,194 2,898,260 298,762 524,665 
It/Kt-1 0.268 0.322 0.352 0.620 
St/Kt-1 5.493 5.208 6.528 8.923 
CFt/Kt-1 0.356 0.380 0.368 0.683 
Dt-1/Kt-1 0.772 0.990 0.613 1.385 
 
 
The main conclusions are the following. Firstly, the mean value of fixed assets and the mean value of 
investment in fixed assets are seven and six times greater for large firms than for small firms, respectively. This fact 
clearly shows how different the firms included in each group are. Secondly, the mean rate of investment in fixed 
assets is greater for small firms than for large firms (35% vs. 27%, respectively). Thirdly, during the period under 
study, the cash flow rates were similar for both types of firms. Finally, large firms rely more on debt than small 
firms. This fact may suggest that large firms have an easier access to financial markets than small firms, which is an 
indication that financing constraints might exist in financial markets. 
 
The second criterion used to identify firms according to asymmetric information problems was a firm‟s age 
(mature firms vs. young firms). The hypothesis under test was whether the impact of cash flows is higher for young 
firms than for mature ones. Actually, some authors (e.g. Kim, 1999, Chirinko and Schaller, 1995, and Oliner and 
Rudebusch , 1992) argue that mature firms are less likely to face information problems in capital markets. Two main 
reasons justify this rationale. Firstly, creditors have, in general, more information about mature firms, since they 
have been visible for a longer period of time in the market. Secondly, mature firms can establish continued 
relationships with creditors and suppliers based on mutual confidence, which helps alleviate information problems. 
 
The cut-off value chosen for this criterion was the age of 10 years to avoid the group of young firms to be 
comprised of a small number, which could affect the quality of regression estimates. Therefore, the group of mature 
firms includes 548 firms and the group of young firms is comprised of 166 firms. Table 2 shows descriptive 
statistics for both types of firms – mature and young. 
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics for Firms Classified According to Age (S.D. indicates Standard Deviation) 
Variables 
Mature Firms Young firms 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
K  (€) 3,730,392 6,846,055 1,930,775 3,737,832 
I  (€) 780,090 1,814,817 431,387 934,335 
It/Kt-1 0.319 0.523 0.370 0.666 
St/Kt-1 6.066 7.404 6.968 10.333 
CFt/Kt-1 0.365 0.563 0.368 0.789 
Dt-1/Kt-1 0.671 1.424 0.590 0.769 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 This cut-off value corresponds to the mean value between the mean value of sales for the manufacturing sector in 1990 and in 
2000, respectively (the first and the last year of the sample), as they appear in the Sector Tables produced by the Central Balance-
sheet data Office of the Bank of Portugal. 
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As can be observed from the table, mature firms present mean values for fixed assets and for investment in 
fixed assets that are twice as large as that for young firms. This is an indication that mature firms tend to be larger 
than young firms. However, this effect tends to be counterbalanced as young firms show a mean rate of investment 
in fixed assets higher than mature firms (37% vs. 32%). Notice, also, that mature firms rely more on debt than young 
firms. This can be explained by the fact that mature firms are less subject to information problems in financial 
markets. 
 
Proxies for the financial status of a firm 
 
To classify firms according to its financial status two criteria were used: interest coverage ratio and the 
probability of bankruptcy. 
 
The decision to split the sample according to the interest coverage ratio
5
 is justified by the fact that the 
interest coverage ratio can be thought of as a proxy for the premium that firms have to pay for external finance 
(Guariglia, 1999). Alternatively, the coverage ratio can be seen as an indicator of the level of internal funds that a 
firm possesses and which it can use to finance its investment projects. Therefore, it is assumed that financial 
variables have a greater impact on investment expenses of high interest coverage firms than on low interest coverage 
firms. 
 
In the empirical study, a cut-off value of five was used to split firms. On the one hand, five corresponds to 
the mean value shown in the Sector Tables produced by the Central Balance-sheet data Office of the Bank of 
Portugal for the period under analysis. On the other hand, this value is of the same magnitude as the one used by 
Guariglia (1999: 46) for UK, which indicates that “a threshold of five represents the level at which bankers might 
begin to feel concern about the ability of a company in the manufacturing sector to service and/or pay back its 
debts”. Therefore, the group of firms with high coverage ratio is comprised of 312 firms and the group of low 
coverage firms includes 402. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for both types of firms – high and low coverage 
firms, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics for Firms Classified According to the Interest Coverage Ratio  
(S.D. indicates Standard Deviation) 
Variables 
High Coverage Firms Low Coverage Firms 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
K  (€) 3,564,357 6,849,782 3,116,129 5,847,064 
I  (€) 800,356 1,744,622 620,368 1,585,138 
It/Kt-1 0.353 0.562 0.314 0.564 
St/Kt-1 7.049 9.140 5.675 7.307 
CFt/Kt-1 0.489 0.709 0.269 0.527 
Dt-1/Kt-1 0.410 1.057 0.840 1.436 
 
 
The main features are the following. Firstly, both types of firms tend to be of a similar size, since they have 
an almost identical mean value for the stock of fixed assets and investment in fixed assets. Secondly, high coverage 
firms have a cash flow rate double than that for low coverage firms. Finally, this type of firms relies heavily on debt 
to finance its operations. 
 
The probability of bankruptcy was the last criterion used to classify firms. The motivation underlying the 
use of this criterion is based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997: 208): “It is plausible that financially distressed firms 
will exhibit low investment-cash flow sensitivities. For example, an insolvent firm might be forced by its creditors to 
use additional cash flow to repay debt rather than for capital expenditures. This necessarily will reduce the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow”.  
 
 
                                                 
5 The interest coverage ratio is measured as the ratio between operating income and interest expenses. 
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To measure the probability of bankruptcy, the Altman (1968) Z-Score was used. Hence, it is expected that 
internal funds (e.g. cash flows) have a major impact on capital expenditures of low probability of bankruptcy firms 
than for their counterparts. Each group of firms has exactly the same number
6
 –  357. Table 4 shows descriptive 
statistics for both types of firms – low probability and high probability firms. 
 
 
Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics for Firms Classified According to the Probability of Bankruptcy  
(S.D. indicates Standard Deviation) 
Variables 
Low Probability Firms High Probability Firms 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
K  (€) 2,052,485 4,758,290 4,571,502 7,333,920 
I  (€) 497,348 1,180,472 900,690 2,007,605 
It/Kt-1 0.370 0.576 0.292 0.547 
St/Kt-1 9.021 9.703 3.530 4.983 
CFt/Kt-1 0.497 0.696 0.233 0.506 
Dt-1/Kt-1 0.602 1.227 0.702 1.371 
 
 
In comparison with high probability bankruptcy firms, low probability firms tend: (a) to be of smaller size; 
(b) to have a higher turnover of fixed assets; (c) to generate more cash flows as a proportion of fixed assets; and (d) 
to rely less on debt. Clearly, these features indicate that low probability of bankruptcy firms are in a better financial 
position than high probability of bankruptcy firms. 
 
ECONOMETRIC INVESTMENT EQUATION 
 
To test the two empirical predictions set forth in the introduction, two alternative specifications for the 
econometric investment equation were adopted: (a) an error-correction model and (b) an Euler-equation model. 
 
Error-Correction Model 
 
The error-correction model adopted in this paper follows the one proposed by Bond et al. (2003). 
According to these authors «the basic idea is to nest a long-run specification for the firm‟s demand for capital within 
a regression model that allows a flexible specification for shot-run investment dynamics to be estimated from the 
data». Therefore, the investment equation would be as follows: 
 
Iit/Kit-1 =  ρ(Iit-1/Kit-2) + 1Δsit + 2Δsit-1 + 3(kit-2 – sit-2) + i + t + it (Eq. 1) 
 
where I represents the firm‟s investment in fixed assets; K is the firm‟s stock of capital; s corresponds to the natural 
logarithm of sales; k is the natural logarithm of the stock of capital; (i) corresponds to the firm effect, (t) to the 
time effect and (it) is the error term. The subscripts i and t correspond to firm and time, respectively. 
 
In order to analyse the impact of internal funds on investment decisions of firms, Bond et al. (2003) 
suggested to add current and lagged cash flow (CF) to Equation 1. In this paper, the lagged debt (D) variable was 
also included. Hence, the investment equation becomes: 
 
Iit/Kit-1 =  ρ(Iit-1/Kit-2) + 1Δsit + 2Δsit-1 + 3(kit-2 – sit-2) + 4(CFit/Kit-1) + 5(CFit-1/Kit-2) + 6(Dit-1/Kit-1) + i + t + it 
   (Eq. 2) 
 
As far as the expected relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables is 
concerned, it can be said that a positive relationship between the following variables would be expected: 
 
 
                                                 
6 The decision of splitting the sample into two sub-samples with the same number of firms is due to the fact that no benchmark 
value for the Z-Score was found adequate to set as a threshold. 
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1. investment (I) and sales growth (s), given the accelerator principle. 
2. investment (I) and cash flow (CF). However, it is expected a differentiated impact (in terms of magnitude) 
of cash flow on investment expenses of firms, depending on the classification criteria adopted, as explained 
in the empirical predictions that are under testing. 
 
On the other hand, a negative relationship would be expected: 
 
1. between firms‟ investment (I) and the error-correction term (kit-2 – sit-2). In fact, when the capital stock is 
above its desired level, it is expected a lower investment in the future. 
2. between firms‟ investment (I) and its debt level (D). This can be explained by the fact that the greater the 
debt the greater the proportion of operating earnings devoted to service debt, and less funds are left for 
investment. 
 
Euler-Equation Approach 
 
Another specification adopted for the econometric investment equation was based on the Euler approach. 
This approach derives from a structural model, in which it is possible to obtain, from the first-order conditions for a 
dynamic optimisation problem and assuming quadratic adjustment costs, the Euler equation for investment. 
 
According to Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), the objective is to test whether an Euler equation derived 
under the assumption of perfect capital markets is rejected by the data. If, in fact, these markets are not perfect, the 
model would be misspecified for the group of firms more financially constrained. Moreover, the Euler equation 
approach takes into account explicitly the recurrent nature of a firm‟s decisions and reduces the information 
conditions to those necessary to determine the optimal course of investment, using the information available in each 
period (Palenzuela and Iturriaga, 1998). On other words, it is emphasized that the investment rate of period t is 
positively related with the investment rate expected for the period t+1 (Bond and Meghir, 1994). Additionally, this 
approach has the advantage that the structure of the Euler equation model allows to control for the influence of 
financial variables on expectations of future profitability (Bond et al., 2003). 
 
The empirical specification adopted for the econometric investment equation is based on Bond and Meghir 
(1994): 
 
(I/K)it =  1(I/K)it-1 + 2(I/K)
2
it-1 + 3(CF/K)it-1 + 4(S/K)it-1 + 5 (D/K)
2
it-1 + i + t + it (Eq. 3) 
 
where I represents the firm‟s investment in fixed assets; CF is cash flow; S corresponds to sales; and D is debt of the 
firm. All variables are divided by the stock of capital (K) to address the problem of heteroscedasticity. (i) 
corresponds to the firm effect, (t) to the time effect and (it) is the error term. The subscripts i and t correspond to 
firm and time, respectively. 
 
According to Bond and Meghir (1994), under the null hypothesis of no financial constraints, it would be 
expected the following signs for the parameters estimates: 1 > 1; 2 <0 but > 1 in absolute value; 3 < 0; 4 > 0; and 
5 > 0. Under the alternative hypothesis, investment spending is positively related to cash flows through the effect of 
financing constraints, suggesting that the Euler equation is misspecified (Bond et al, 2003). 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, the empirical results obtained for the investment-cash flow relationship are shown, for both 
specifications adopted for the econometric investment equation. When analysing regression results the main focus of 
attention is the estimated coefficient of the cash flow variable, which reflects the impact of internal funds on the 
capital expenditures of firms. 
 
Given the possible endogeneity of the regressors that may occur as a result of the dynamic nature of the 
econometric specification, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation procedure was adopted, as 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). All equations were estimated in first differences to eliminate the firm-
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specific time-invariant effects. Lags of the dependent and explanatory variables were used as instruments. 
 
Error-Correction Model 
 
Firms Classified According to the Degree of Asymmetric Information Problems 
 
Table 5 shows the regression results obtained when firms were classified according to the degree of 
asymmetric information problems they face (i.e. by size and age). 
 
As seen in the table, internal funds have a major impact on investment expenses of firms that face more 
severe information problems in financial markets. In fact, for both small and young firms, the estimated coefficient 
on the cash flow variable is almost double that for large and mature firms. This finding gives support to the 
hypothesis of the existence of financing constraints on financial markets (at least for certain types of firms). 
 
 
Table 5 – Regression Results for Firms Classified According to the Degree of Asymmetric Information Problems 
Independent Variable 
Size Age 
Large Small Mature Young 
Iit-1/Kit-2 0.175* 
(0.0303) 
-0.010 
(0.0268) 
-0.267* 
(0.0242) 
0.108* 
(0.0281) 
Δsit -0.071*** 
(0.0439) 
-0.094 
(0.0663) 
0.229* 
(0.0506) 
-0.155* 
(0.0598) 
Δsit-1 -0.020 
(0.0444) 
0.012 
(0.0442) 
0.098*** 
(0.0520) 
0.063 
(0.0398) 
(kit-2 – sit-2) 0.039 
(0.0416) 
-0.097** 
(0.0383) 
-0.388* 
(0.0569) 
-0.067** 
(0.0337) 
CFit/Kit-1 0.301* 
(0.0694) 
0.513* 
(0.0810) 
0.323* 
(0.0189) 
0.558* 
(0.0958) 
CFit-1/Kit-2 0.070** 
(0.0291) 
0.032 
(0.0467) 
0.276* 
(0.0210) 
-0.140** 
(0.0612) 
Dit-1/Kit-1 0.053* 
(0.0121) 
0.058 
(0.0376) 
0.068** 
(0.0293) 
0.108* 
(0.0376) 
Sargan test 0.367 0.045 0.328 0.037 
Nº Obs. 1392 4320 4384 1328 
Dependent variable, Iit/Kit-1. The GMM first-differences estimation procedure was adopted. The instrument set used includes all 
right-side variables dated t-2. In the estimation time dummies were included. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
A surprising result is the negative sign in the variable sales growth (of the current period), which 
contradicts what one would be expecting, given de accelerator principle. 
 
Finally, as expected, the coefficient on the error-correction term is negative (except for large firms where it 
is positive but has no statistical significance). 
 
Firms Classified According to the Financial Status 
 
Table 6 shows the regression results obtained when firms were classified according to their financial status 
(i.e. by the probability of bankruptcy and interest coverage ratio). 
 
From the table, it is clear that internal funds have a higher influence on investment expenses of firms in a 
poor financial situation, contrary to what was expected. In fact, for this type of firm (high bankruptcy probability 
firms and low interest coverage ratio firms) the estimated coefficient on the cash flow variable is double that for 
healthier firms. Hence, this result does not corroborate the argument of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), suggesting that 
investment expenses of financially distressed firms could be insensitive to cash flow variations. 
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Table 6 – Regression Results for Firms Classified According to its Financial Status 
Independent Variable 
Bankruptcy Probability Coverage Ratio 
High Low Low High 
Iit-1/Kit-2 0.113* 
(0.0262) 
-0.136* 
(0.0269) 
0.068* 
(0.0261) 
-0.120* 
(0.0268) 
Δsit -0.136** 
(0.0543) 
0.016 
(0.0527) 
-0.110** 
(0.0584) 
0.052 
(0.0521) 
Δsit-1 0.081*** 
(0.0426) 
-0.003 
(0.0517) 
0.099** 
(0.0423) 
0.047 
(0.0554) 
(kit-2 – sit-2) -0.097* 
(0.0320) 
-0.103** 
(0.0531) 
-0.069** 
(0.0332) 
-0.173* 
(0.0494) 
CFit/Kit-1 0.671* 
(0.1132) 
0.352* 
(0.0291) 
0.665* 
(0.1196) 
0.335* 
(0.0237) 
CFit-1/Kit-2 -0.204* 
(0.0585) 
0.183* 
(0.0293) 
-0.136** 
(0.0610) 
0.173* 
(0.0313) 
Dit-1/Kit-1 0.152* 
(0.0318) 
0.005 
(0.0144) 
0.097* 
(0.0326) 
-0.026* 
(0.0085) 
Sargan test 0.098 0.056 0.382 0.0009 
Nº Obs. 2856 2856 3216 2496 
Dependent variable, Iit/Kit-1. The GMM first-differences estimation procedure was adopted. The instrument set used includes all 
right-side variables dated t-2. In the estimation time dummies were included. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
However, it should, also, be noted that the coefficient of lagged cash flow is negatively signed for firms in 
poor financial situation, making the overall impact of cash flow variable on investment decisions of firms less 
markedly different between both types of firms. 
 
An interesting finding is that the coefficients on the sales growth variables (of the current period) are 
correctly signed but are not statistically different from zero for healthier firms, whereas the opposite situation occurs 
for firms in bad financial position. 
 
Euler-Equation Approach 
 
Firms Classified According to the Degree of Asymmetric Information Problems 
 
Table 7 shows the regression results obtained when firms were classified according to the degree of 
asymmetric information problems they face (i.e. by size and age). 
 
 
Table 7 – Regression Results for Firms Classified According to the Degree of Asymmetric Information Problems 
Independent Variable 
Size Age 
Large Small Mature Young 
(I/K)it-1 2.014* 
(0.1250) 
1.596* 
(0.1804) 
2.139* 
(0.1584) 
1.438* 
(0.2222) 
(I/K)2it-1 -2.712* 
(0.1702) 
-1.863* 
(0.2376) 
-2.562* 
(0.1852) 
-1.743* 
(0.3016) 
(CF/K)it-1 0.027 
(0.0201) 
0.034* 
(0.0072) 
-0.002 
(0.0134) 
0.044* 
(0.0104) 
(S/K)it-1 0.018* 
(0.0033) 
0.019* 
(0.0019) 
0.015* 
(0.0028) 
0.019* 
(0.0019) 
(D/K)2it-1 0.001 
(0.0011) 
-0.002** 
(0.0008) 
0.017* 
(0.0055) 
-0.002** 
(0.0007) 
Sargan test 0.005 0.000008 0.000014 0.0002 
Nº Obs. 1566 4860 4932 1494 
Dependent variable, (I/K)it. The GMM first-differences estimation procedure was adopted. The instrument set used includes all 
right-side variables dated t-2. In the estimation time dummies were included. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, and ** 
indicate significance at 1%, and 5% level, respectively. 
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In absence of financing constraints, the parameter of the cash flow variable should be negative and the 
parameter of the debt variable should be positive. However, this does not happen for firms a priori identified as more 
financially constrained (small and young firms). Therefore, the results in the table seem to indicate that firms facing 
higher information problems in financial markets are more dependent on internal funds than their counterparts. In 
fact, the value of the estimated parameter of the cash flow variable is higher and only has statistical significance for 
that type of firms.  
 
Firms Classified According to the Financial Status 
 
Table 8 shows the regression results obtained when firms were classified according to their financial status 
(i.e. by the probability of bankruptcy and interest coverage ratio). 
 
 
Table 8 – Regression Results for Firms Classified According to its Financial Status 
Independent Variable 
Bankruptcy Probability Coverage Ratio 
High Low Low High 
(I/K)it-1 1.239* 
(0.2134) 
2.750* 
(0.1664) 
1.245* 
(0.1829) 
2.648* 
(0.1474) 
(I/K)2it-1 -1.436* 
(0.2929) 
-3.398* 
(0.2023) 
-1.453* 
(0.2436) 
-3.307* 
(0.1930) 
(CF/K)it-1 0.046* 
(0.0123) 
0.003 
(0.0103) 
0.040* 
(0.0119) 
0.004 
(0.0105) 
(S/K)it-1 0.024* 
(0.0040) 
0.014* 
(0.0019) 
0.020* 
(0.0023) 
0.012* 
(0.0020) 
(D/K)2it-1 -0.002** 
(0.0011) 
-0.001 
(0.0007) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.005* 
(0.0012) 
Sargan test 0.0006 0.000005 0.00006 0.000001 
Nº Obs. 3213 3213 3618 2808 
Dependent variable, (I/K)it. The GMM first-differences estimation procedure was adopted. The instrument set used includes all 
right-side variables dated t-2. In the estimation time dummies were included. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, and *** 
indicate significance at 1%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Once again, cash flow has a major impact on investment of firms in poor financial situation, as it has been 
observed in Table 6, which contradicts the prediction of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). For firms in better financial 
position, the estimated coefficient of the cash flow variable is not statistically different from zero. 
 
Discussion of the Results 
 
From the regression results obtained above, it is clear that internal funds have a major impact for both firms 
facing higher asymmetric information problems in financial markets and firms in poor financial status. Therefore, 
these results seem to lend support to the predictions of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) instead of the one‟s 
proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
 
A different finding was obtained by Cleary (2006). This author, using a sample of firms from seven 
different countries, concludes that (a) «firms with stronger financial positions are more investment-cash flow 
sensitive than firms with weaker financial positions even after controlling for size and dividend payout»; (b) «higher 
payout firms are more investment-cash flow sensitive than lower payout firms even after controlling for size and 
financial strength» and «the impact of firm […] is much weaker once financial health and dividend payout 
behaviour is controlled for. An explanation, proposed by Cleary (2006), for these results is the effect of the volatility 
of cash flows. In fact, Cleary (2006) found that firms possessing high volatility of cash flow have lower investment-
cash flow sensitivities. Therefore, argues that «this may account for the contradictory empirical findings found in the 
literature if this volatility effect dominates other effects such as information asymmetry and agency costs that 
researchers attempt to measure using their financial constraint groupings». 
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On the other hand, there are several empirical studies that corroborate the influence of internal funds on a 
firm‟s investment decision. For example, Agca and Mozumdar (2008) found that «the sensitivity of investment to 
the availability of internal funds is significant trough different time periods» and «is linked to capital market 
imperfections». In their empirical study they concluded that the «investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases when 
there is a reduction in capital market imperfections through increased fund flows, institutional ownership, analyst 
following, antitakeover amendments and with the existence of a bond rating». Therefore, they argue that «capital 
market factors that decrease market imperfections and as a result reduce the cost wedge between external and 
internal funds, lead to lower investment-cash flow sensitivities». 
 
Islam and Mozumdar (2007), using a sample of firms from thirty one countries, examined whether the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity was affected by the degree of financial markets development. They concluded that 
«corporate investments are more sensitive to internal cash flow for firms in countries with less developed financial 
markets». 
 
Moreover, Aggarwal and Zong (2006) studied the investment-cash flow relationship using a sample of 
firms from each of the two largest market- and bank-centered economies (US and UK vs. German and Japan). The 
findings obtained were (a) internal cash flows are significantly positively related to investment levels in all four 
countries, fact that they interpret as «strong evidence that firms have limited access to external finance and these 
results are consistent with the pecking order theory of corporate financing»; (b) «there is much support for the 
original FHP (1988) position in three of the four countries (UK, Germany, and Japan)» given that «investment levels 
in the financially stronger firms are less influenced by the availability of internal cash flows as such firms can 
presumably raise any necessary external funds for good projects». 
 
Finally, Bhagat, Moyen and Suh (2005) compared the investment policy of distresses firms in relation to 
that of healthy firms. They obtain the following findings. Firstly, they document «a negative cash flow sensitivity 
for distressed firms with operating losses and a positive sensitivity for all other firms». Secondly, they show that 
«the negative cash flow sensitivity is generated by distressed firms with operating losses that invest more than the 
previous year. These firms invest more when their cash flows are decreasing. Because the investment is funded by 
equity claimants, the evidence suggests a gamble for resurrection». Thirdly, they provide evidence consistent with 
«an asset substitution problem only for the subset of financially distressed firms with operating losses that invest 
more than the previous year». Finally, they document that «healthy firms invest more and have a lower leverage 
than financially distressed firms». 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Beginning with the paper of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), an extensive empirical literature has 
documented the influence of financial variables on investment decisions of firms, particularly for those facing higher 
information problems on financial markets, such as small and young firms. However, this empirical finding was 
questioned by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who showed that the level of internal funds has a greater impact on 
investment expenses of financially healthier firms. 
 
In this paper, we tried to shed some light in the investment-internal funds controversy by emphasising 
whether the classification criteria adopted to split firms into sub-samples has a major influence in the empirical 
results that have been obtained in different studies, which would allow to reconcile these results. In this sense, two 
main empirical predictions were tested. Firstly, if firms are classified according to the degree of asymmetric 
information problems that they face in financial markets, a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow would be 
expected for firms that face these problems at a higher level. Secondly, if firms are classified according to their 
financial status, investment by firms in a better financial position would be expected to be more sensitive to cash 
flow variations. 
 
However, the empirical findings obtained in this paper, using two different specifications for the 
econometric investment equation and a sample of Portuguese manufacturing firms, did not allow to confirm these 
empirical predictions. In fact, from the regression results obtained, it was possible to see that the cash flow variable 
has a major impact for both firms facing higher asymmetric information problems in financial markets and firms in 
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poor financial status. Thus, one can be led to think that these results would favour the predictions of Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1988) instead of the one‟s proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Yet, more research is 
needed to gain a consistent and unambiguous perception of the true relationship between a firm‟s investment 
expenses and its financial position. 
 
In terms of policy implications, the strong connection between a firm‟s financial status and investment 
suggests that in the case, for example, of a restrictive monetary policy, the real economy will be affected not only 
through the traditional channel of the cost of capital, but also through the availability of funds channel, which means 
that an increase in interest expenses of firms will reduce the availability of relatively cheap internal funds and 
increase the cost of external funds. Another important policy implication resulting from this study is the impact of 
tax policy changes. The main argument is that when firms face restrictions in obtaining finance due to imperfections 
in the financial markets, any increase in the tax revenue coming from tax charged to firms has a negative impact on 
investment, since it limits the availability of funds to which the company can access to achieve its investment plans. 
Therefore, it could be argued that tax policy measures, such as the reduction in corporate tax rate, measures that 
disincentive high dividend payouts, accelerated depreciation allowances, and the introduction of an investment tax 
credit could induce more investment in fixed capital by firms. 
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